Nosedragger wrote:Lost a family member a year ago April 6th to that. Must have been an awful last 3 minutes. Hard to believe a skylane can make an 8 foot deep hole when operated by the inner ear.

M6RV6 wrote:At least if you get the rating you should be able to hold an altitude and make a turn with out killing yourself.

Nosedragger wrote:Those that got their privates in busy places probably don't have this stigma, but us hillbillies in Idaho were never exposed to much radio work.

There are those who argue that the study which led to the 178 seconds rule is flawed, but whether it is or isn't, the fact is that flying VFR into IMC by an unqualified pilot is a leading cause of fatal crashes.

You don't need an IR to realize that if you can't see outside, to pay attention inside!

Cary wrote:

You don't need an IR to realize that if you can't see outside, to pay attention inside!

But that is exactly what doesn't happen. Instead of gluing to the instruments, VFR pilots encountering IMC invariably continue to try to maintain control by looking outside.

I've described this situation so many times that I might have done so here, too, and if so, forgive the repetitiveness. My first start-to-finish student was a good stick, and he'd already had his 3 hours of required hood time, but no actual. He could navigate well, he did well on unusual attitude recovery, etc. He had voiced more than once that he didn't see what the big deal was, flying on instruments.

He wanted to take his long dual to Jackson, so with his wife in the back seat, we set off on the usual route from Laramie, via Medicine Bow, Riverton, etc. But northwest of Riverton, the route was getting socked in. He asked if we could file IFR, but I explained that there was no way to get a 172 with 3 aboard up to the MEA of 14,000'. He finally turned us around as the vis narrowed down, I took over and told him to plot the route to Casper, and then he flew us there, where we had lunch. While there, I filed IFR back to Laramie, anticipating we'd run into some of what made us turn around earlier.

Soon after crossing Casper Mountain, we were in and out of the clouds. After only a short time, we were a-kilter off to the left. I tapped the AI, and he immediately corrected, but a few minutes later, it happened again. After tapping the AI again and he corrected, I called Center and got a block altitude and advised that we'd likely divert from the centerline of the airway, because this was a training flight. He couldn't hear me, because this was olden times--we weren't using headsets and an intercom.

In only a couple minutes, we were into a diving left turn. This time I let it go while we lost several hundred feet and turned nearly 180 degrees, before tapping him on the shoulder and asking him where we were going. He righted the airplane, climbed back up to altitude and got us on course. Then he asked what was happening, and I told him that he was looking outside way too much and not enough on the instruments.

So he locked onto the panel. But within only a few minutes, although he was still in control, he asked if I could take over. He was visibly sweating although it was cool in the airplane. He admitted, "This is just too much work!" So I took over and let him relax for awhile.

About 20 minutes out of Laramie, the clouds parted, and I had him take over. But I couldn't have created a better learning experience for him, to discourage playing games with poor visibility. Had I not been there to see what he was doing and get him to get onto the guages, there is little doubt that the airplane would have crashed.

So while the theory is good, just look at the instruments, the reality is that it doesn't happen, and people die.

Cary