Mr Hoover version compared to the FAA's, And we know as the FAA is part of the Government that they never would undertake anything slight of hand!
The Case
Questionable Performance?
The story began at the Aerospace America Air Show in June 1992 where Bob Hoover was performing his usual aerobatic routine in his Shrike Commander. As a practice, FAA safety inspectors were observing the air show. During his act, Hoover apparently did not perform perfectly, to which, later, Hoover admitted was because of a malfunction of the airplane. He had an oil pump cavitation and cowl flap problem, he had said (Avweb, 1995). Two safety inspectors, Clint Boehler and James Kelln, who were allegedly at two different vantage points, noticed the slight abnormality of the routine. However, they did not bother to discuss with Hoover that day about their concerns.
"Voicing Concerns"
According to William Hark, an FAA medical expert, the two inspectors voiced their concerns to the local FSDO safety official, a co-worker, as well as their supervisors, as to "what should we do about this." That was 2 days after the show. The safety official had said that "Well, if you ask me, I'll talk to the medical people," and he proceeded to report the "problem" to the medical certification division. Dr. Hark said that he was "convinced that this was done out of concern for both Mr. Hoover's well being as the well-being of the people that attend these shows" (Avweb, 1995).
The First Round
It was not until 2 months later that the inspectors actually submitted a written report to the FAA medical doctors. It was based on these two reports that the FAA asked Hoover to submit to medical reevaluation (AOPA, 1996). In AOPA's "Pilot Counsel: A Chapter in the Life of Bob Hoover," John Yodice explains what then happened:
The FAA sent him to a psychiatrist in the Los Angeles area, who conducted "a comprehensive clinical evaluation, including extensive testing by a psychologist and a neurologist. The psychiatrist selected by the FAA, after reviewing the results of all the testing, concluded: "It is my opinion that Mr. Hoover is currently fit to hold a second class medical certificate from a neuropsychological and a neuropsychiatric point of view and should therefore be permitted to continue his flight activities."
"Voluntary Surrender"
The process did not stop. Dr. Bart Pakull, FAA's chief psychiatrist "referred the test results to a psychologist who has been a consultant to the FAA for 10 or 12 years and who has known Dr. Pakull for 15 years" (AOPA, 1994). After the psychologist gave his opinion to Dr. Pakull, he, "along with the FAA federal air surgeon, got on the telephone to Hoover and his doctor and told them that Hoover was not medically qualified. Hoover was told to surrender his medical certificate to his doctor. Hoover thought he had to, so he did" (AOPA, 1994). Hoover did not know that he did not have to, as stated explicitly in FAR 61.3(h). AOPA explained this regulation in its 1996 article, "Pilot Counsel � Hoover: The System Didn't Work:"
This regulation does require that a certificate holder "present it for inspection" if requested by the FAA, NTSB, or a law enforcement officer. However, it does not require surrender. If the FAA wants the certificate, it must honor the procedure required by law for the protection of the airman. Of course, a person may voluntarily surrender his or her certificate, but this situation may be easily misunderstood. So easily, in fact, that FAR 61.27 requires a person to sign a statement making clear that he or she understands the consequences of the voluntary surrender of a certificate. Unfortunately, FAR 61.27 applies only to pilot and flight instructor certificates. It does not apply to medical certificates.
The Second Round
Bob was "flabbergasted" that the FAA had said that he was medically unfit to fly, and he asked for a second chance; after all, he had flown 33 performances without a hitch since the Oklahoma air show (AOPA 1994). This time, Hoover was examined by UCLA Neuropsychiatric Institute. As mentioned in "A Chapter of the Life of Bob Hoover," UCLA gave him a favorable report:
"We favor a recommendation that reinstates his license on a temporary 3-6 month period during which his current medical and neuropsychological status is closely monitored for potential change. Although such change is unlikely. . . . "
Results of the UCLA's test were sent to Georgetown Medical School where two doctors concluded, without personally examining him, that Bob Hoover was unfit to fly. Apparently Dr. Pakull and the FAA favored the unfavorable results over the favorable results and held the generally held unfavorable position that Hoover was unfit to fly. The FAA would not even give him a certificate limited to 3 or 6 months (AOPA, 1994). At about this time, Hoover's friends and famed attorney F. Lee Bailey and aviation attorney John Yodice decided to help. Yodice began informal discussions with the FAA doctors, whom, as John said, "always had an FAA lawyer in attendance. " Also, Dr. Pakull reportedly never was in attendance at these sessions. "The talks went nowhere" (AOPA, 1994).
The Third Round
Bob, still believing in his heart that there were simply some mistakes made, asked to be examined yet a third time to prove to the FAA that he was, indeed, fit to fly. This third time, Dr. Hisely, a neurosurgeon and a flight surgeon with the fighter squadron at Tinker Air Force Base in Oklahoma, performed the exam. Dr. Hisely is an active pilot who flies the Pitts Special, a P-51 Mustang, and the F-16 Falcon. He also certifies pilots medically fit to fly the F-16, and has no official connection to the FAA (AOPA, 1994). He promised Hoover that he would be tough on Hoover, forthright in his opinion, and that he would do a comprehensive exam on him. Hoover passed the exams that Hisely, along with clinical psychologist and pilot David Johnson administered. The FAA still did not give Hoover his medical back. (Remember that Hoover had given his medical to them because they had said he was not "medically qualified.")
Emergency Revocation
At this point F. Lee Baily and John Yodice formally demanded a return of Hoover's medical certificate. It was after this demand that the FAA used their power of emergency revocation of certificates under 49 U.S.C. 44709(c) and 46105(c), and revoked Bob Hoover's medical certificate. This emergency revocation policy is embodied in FAA Order 2150.3A. Under that emergency revocation procedure, the person had the right to appeal to the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the Federal Court of Appeals. However, the person loses the right to operate while the revocation proceeding is pending. The definition of "emergency" to the FAA is when a "certificate holder lack the technical qualification or the care, judgment and responsibility to hold a certificate." Senator James M. Inhofe has aptly pointed out that this definition was changed "in 1992, without review by congress or public comment." After revoking his medical certificate, the FAA said that Hoover's ability to fly had nothing to do with the impairment that the doctor's had found in a cognitive skills assessment. They simply believed that "Hoover could pose a threat to safety should an emergency occur."
Appeals
When Bob Hoover's medical certificate was revoked, there were two aspects of the revocation that could be appealed: the emergency nature of the order, or the merits of the order. If he challenged the emergency nature of the revocation order, the appeal would be taken to Federal Court. If he challenged the merits of the order, the appeal would be to the NTSB. Bob chose to appeal the emergency nature of the order. The case was assigned to an Administrative Law Judge, and then was reviewed by the full Board.
Proof
F. Lee Baily had suggested that Mr. Hoover videotape his routine to show the judge that he was competent to fly. Hoover flew his routine in an ex-navy T-28B Trainer. Ray Hughes, who has a letter of authorization in the aircraft, videotaped from the back seat. Here is the account of the flight as filed and described in Forever Flying:
Prior to takeoff, the engine was warmed up until the oil temperature and pressure were in the green. The engine run-up and magneto check were normal without a drop in rpm. . . .The engine operation was normal through a series of maneuvers. . .Two loops and one-half of a Cuban eight were performed. Upon recovering from this maneuver, the Chip warning red light illuminated, indicating a detection of metal in the oil system. This warrants landing the airplane as soon as possible.
Immediately following the illumination of the Chip light, the propeller governor control failed to hold the engine and propeller rpm, causing an excessive overspeed condition. This resulted in an increase on the oil temperature gauge and decrease in oil pressure. The engine was kept running intermittently by constantly manipulating the engine controls, throttle, mixture, and propeller lever, as well as the engine cooling flaps. Each time the engine would stop running or backfire, an adjustment was made to get it running again. When the engine was running it felt as if it would shake the airplane apart. The airplane was headed on a straight line to the Torrance airport immediately after the Chip warning light came on.
The control tower was advised of the Mayday with a request for a straight-in approach. The T-28B was landed without power on the end of the runway 29. Right at touchdown, the engine froze, shaking the airplane so severely so as to break the fittings, attach points to the fuselage to the wings, and twist the engine from its mount. The bolts holding the engine mounts were sheared and the engine twisted the fuselage.
The Hearing
Hoover brought his case before the Administrative Law Judge William R. Mullins. Apparently, "the FAA had hired more doctors to support its case, none of whom had personally examined Hoover" (AOPA, 1994). The judge had to determine whom to believe. Apparently, "there was plenty of medical evidence on both sides (AOPA, 1994). "Judge Mullin decided to believe Hoover's doctors over the FAA doctors. Mullins ordered the FAA to return the medical certificate" (AOPA, 1994). The FAA refused and appealed it to the NTSB five-panel board. The board overturned the judges ruling. Bailey appealed the case on behalf of Hoover all the way up to the Supreme Court and lost. Yodice pointed out that "it is hard to fault the failure of those appeals, because the scope of review in those courts is so narrow that the courts are virtually compelled to uphold the administrative agencies."
No Defeat
Bob Hoover, not one to give up his soul-burning desire to fly (and source of income), simply went Down Under to continue flying. The director of aviation medicine for the Australian CAA was Rob Liddell, one of Hoover's friends. He suggested that Hoover Take an Australian First Class Medical from Dr. Larry Marinelli. Hoover passed the test. Hoover then went on to take the commercial written exam and flight check. He passed with flying colors. He was given a first-class commercial airline pilot rating, meaning, he could fly anywhere in the world besides the United States. Even though Bob could fly Down Under, he still wanted to be able to fly in the United States. And even though many people thought that he should give up the fight, Bob continued.
With the urging of Rob Liddell, Hoover met with Federal Air Surgeon Dr. Jon Jordan face to face. Hoover agreed to pursue his rights without further legal representation and to submit to even more tests, which would personally be reviewed by Dr. Jordan. The reports again were in Bob's favor but Jordan informed Hoover that he still would not get his medical back, but the results would be sent to an independent consultants. At the EAA Fly In in Oshkosh in July of 1995, FAA David Hison felt the heat when he told the inquiring crowd that Bob's test results were being reviewed by independent consultants. Bob Hoover is sure that it was the "thousands of letters and repeated complaints" that caused Jon Jordan and the FAA to change their decision and reinstate Hoover's medical.
It was on Wednesday, October 18, 1995 that the FAA submitted a Statement on Bob Hoover, which read:
The results of new tests conducted this summer and evaluated by outside medical specialists have led the FAA to conclude that Mr. Hoover's condition has stabilized. In light of this, it is appropriate to grant Mr. Hoover a restricted second-class medical certificate that will enable him to resume his air show performances, but under more medical scrutiny than would be required of an airman with an unrestricted second-class medical certificate.
Hoover's Arguments
On three different occasions, Hoover was examined and found fit to fly by the examining doctors. These doctors in all cases were doctors chosen by the FAA to do the exams. Only one dissenting opinion was found from a doctor who personally examined Hoover on his fitness to fly. This was from Dr. Elliot, a neuropsychologist, who participated in the first rounds of Hoover's examinations. The rest of the dissenting opinions were from doctors who never personally examined Hoover. However, it appeared that Dr. Elliot had some credibility issues as John Yodice, in his article, "A Chapter in the Life of Bob Hoover," points out:
Point 1: Before administering the tests, Dr. Elliot assured Hoover that the testing would not have anything to do with losing his certificate. Dr. Elliot admitted in sworn testimony that he gave Hoover that assurance. Yet Dr. Elliot appeared and testified against Hoover.
Point two: One of the tests administered to Hoover was a version of a psychological test that is marketed for use only as a research tool should not be used for clinical decisions. Dr. Elliot insisted under oath that it was not a research version. Then Bailey produced a fax from the distributor saying that the distributor had never shipped anything but a research version.
Dr. Elliot also examined Hoover using an experimental test being developed in part by Dr. Elliot and being pushed by the FAA. This test has not yet been marketed and should not be used for certification decisions. The law judge wisely excluded this test from evidence.
Point three: At the conclusion of his examination back in October 1992, Dr. Elliot produced a lengthy eight-page, single-space report, followed by pages of test results, in which he *never* said that Hoover was unqualified. He merely recommended that Hoover be referred to a neurologist, which was done. After all of the testing, the psychiatrist in charge of the evaluation (and to whom Dr. Elliot sent his report) said Hoover was qualified. It was not until some time later that, inexplicitly, Dr. Elliot expressed the opinion that Hoover was not qualified.
Point four: Dr. Elliot earns $50,000 a year part-time assessing pilots for the FAA. He charged $1,700 to examine Hoover. In other words, he has an ongoing financial relationship with the FAA.
Incidentally, Dr. Elliot was the only doctor to take the witness stand against Hoover. The Hoover team produced a least two doctors, Dr. Hisely and Dr. Johnson, to testify for Hoover who had personally examined him. The Hoover team also produced an FAA safety inspector, Norb Nester who testified for Hoover on the questionable motives of the two safety inspectors that had originally filed a report against Hoover. Apparently, he had overheard one of them refer to Hoover as "an old bastard" and "that [Hoover] has been around a long time, and he is not what he once was. He has never been violated because of who he is. It's time he has to stand accountable like everyone else" (Hoover and Shaw, 1996). (Norb was fired from the FAA.) Hoover also had fellow aerobatic pilots testify about his condition on the day of the air show at the hearing.
FAA Arguments
I have to admit that I found very few facts during my research as to the FAA's position. The only recurring theme that seemed to be pointed out was that the rumors of the safety inspectors conspiring to write the report to ground Hoover was just that -- rumors. Also resounding is the idea that Hoover was not grounded based on the reports of the inspectors, but based on the reports of the medical exams. I'm fairly certain that there was some sort of hard medical evidence suggesting that Hoover had scored low on some of the medical exams, but I was unable to find that evidence. In defending the time it took for the inspectors to write the reports, FAA's Anthony Broderick told Avweb.com "I think the point is that it wasn't viewed as something of high enough priority to bump the other work that the inspectors were doing, and that's what the initial delay was."
A Step in the Right Direction
The Hoover Case certainly brought to light the awesome power that the FAA and safety inspectors have to use at their discretion against individual pilots. Because of this case, a General Accounting Office study was done on the FAA's use of emergency revocation of certificates. They found that from 1990 to 1997 the percentage of emergency actions increased from 10% of total certificate actions to an average of 20%. They also pointed out that 86% of the time, the FAA decision to revoke the certificate is held up on appeal. The results of the GAO study were used to introduce the Hoover Bill, which has now become law. Under the Hoover Bill, pilots now have 48 hours to appeal an FAA emergency certificate revocation to the NTSB. The NTSB has five days after such an appeal to consider if the revocation is an emergency. They then have 60 days to finally dispose of the underlying certificate suspension or revocation (AOPA, 2000).
And this would have made it impossible for me to go into Canada, which I usually do AT LEAST twice a year!
1 OF THE FOREMOST PILOTS TO EVER GET IN AN AIRCRAFT! 
