Edited (because a human being tragically died what I consider to be an unnecessary death and i have no desire to call out anyone or embbarras.)

From the final report: airplane collided with terrain... pilot was fatally injured... airplane was destroyed by impact forces and post impact fire... operating it under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91. Visual flight rules conditions existed near the accident site at the time of the accident...

The pilot was conducting the first flight... since purchasing it... the pilot aborted the takeoff for unknown reasons. The pilot taxied the airplane back to the end of the runway and then took off again.

Witnesses described the airplane pitching up while banking during the takeoff. One witness stated that he could see the top of the wings, as if the airplane was straight up and down, before it turned to the southeast. Several witnesses reported hearing "good" engine sounds. Other witnesses, who saw the airplane just before the impact, reported that it was in a steep nose-down, left descending spiral. Two witnesses reported seeing the airplane spiral one and a half to three times before it descended below the trees, followed by a plume of black smoke.

data indicated that the airplane departed... The climb then continued to 1,050 agl, at which point the airplane entered a descent and was then lost on radar.

The pilot held a private pilot certificate with a single-engine land rating, which was issued (28 years, 11 months, and 20 days before the crash)... According to (the pilot's logbook his) total time was 312.1 hours, of which the pilot recorded 4.8 hours with a flight instructor (obtaining a tail wheel endorsement between 66 and 45 days before the crash)...at which time the pilot completed a flight review...

The pilot's logbook contained entries from (his first lesson), between (18 and 12 years before the crash) the pilot recorded 10.2 hours of flight experience. There were no entries between (then and the 4.8 hours with an instructor noted above). The pilot did not log any flight time in a (type of aircraft he crashed) airplane... the logbook did contain a tailwheel endorsement. The pilot's most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) medical certificate was issued on (6 months and 3 days before the crash).

The flight instructor, who had flown with the pilot (and endorsed his log book)... stated that they had discussed whether to have an experienced pilot conduct the first flight in the pilot's airplane after purchase. The flight instructor stated that the pilot replied that he was going to conduct the first flight...

On (5 months, 3 days before the accident, and 2 months 3 days before starting with the CFI to obtain his tailwheel endorsement), the pilot ground looped the airplane, which resulted in landing gear damage, while taxiing...

The wreckage path from the initial impact point to the main wreckage was on a magnetic heading of 30°... The right wing was found wrapped around a pole about 210 ft from the initial impact. Further along the wreckage path were the fuel tanks, the engine, portions of t he cockpit/fuselage, the empennage, and the propeller hub. The wreckage from the right wing to the end of the wreckage path was mostly destroyed by fire. Pieces of the splintered composite propeller blade, plexiglass, and wood were scattered along the entire wreckage path.

The fuselage and cockpit area were destroyed by fire. The main landing gear assembly was separated from the fuselage. The bottom of the right wing was destroyed from the wing root to the aileron attachment point. The fabric on the top of the wing was scorched and melted in the wing root area. The inboard section of the flap was separated from the wing, and the outboard section remained attached. The aileron remained intact and attached to the wing. The control cables were pulled out from the wing and remained attached to the cockpit control column.

The left wing was destroyed by fire. The left aileron was separated from the wing. The aileron control cable was found near the burned wing, and it remained attached to the cockpit control column.

The fuel tanks were separated from the wings and burned. The fuel tank caps were not in place; however, melted material was visible around the base of the filler neck. Material was visible inside the left fuel tank, and it appeared to be portions of the melted fuel cap. The position of the cockpit fuel selector could not be determined due to impact and fire damage.

The rudder cables remained attached to the bottom of the rudder and tailwheel. Cable continuity from the cockpit area to the forward and aft seat right rudder pedals was established. The forward and aft seat left rudder pedals were not found. However, the left cable was intact, and it contained the turnbuckles and rudder pedal attachment hardware.

The engine was burned, and its right side was impact-damaged. The right valve cover was impact-damaged and was separated from the engine. Two of the valve lifters on the right side were separated from the engine. The left valve cover was in place, and the valves and springs were intact. The oil pan was removed from the engine, and the inside of the engine was intact and contained oil. The propeller was separated from the engine. The ring gear was smashed rearward against the engine case.

One of the propeller's composite blades remained mostly intact and attached to the hub. The butt end of the other two blades remained attached to the hub. The propeller spinner was separated from the hub. The spinner was flattened and exhibited a small amount of torsional bending.

conducted an autopsy of the pilot. The pilot's death was attributed to "multiple blunt force injuries due to an airplane crash."

The FAA's Bioaeronautical Research Sciences Laboratory, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, performed toxicology testing on specimens from the pilot. The testing was negative for carbon monoxide, cyanide, ethanol, and drugs.

I can't make much sense out of the post. Darwin award recipient post mortem and a poor flight instructor that signed off a student when they were not ready.

Mark Y. wrote:I can't make much sense out of the post. .....

Is there a point to the post?

I soloed 72 years after Orville, that was 47 years ago. In the past half century I can't recall knowing anyone who died as a result of an aircraft's mechanical or structural failure. Disintegrating in a dive at three times Vne doesn't count, nor does stalling-- whether dirty in a 30 degree bank at just over the published zero degree Vs, or trying to just stretch it a bit more to get over those trees to get to the threshold.

I've been at airports who lost people doing that as well as trying unsuccessfully to fly through power lines or hilltops in inadvertent IMC or flying into the smooth glassy surface of a lake at twilight. While it sucks when your reciprocating engine gets fed Jet-A, or the yutz who disassembled your fuel selector put it back together wrong those things cause emergencies or forced landings. Mostly people die when they try to do something beyond their capabilities.

Sometimes the first flight-- or just taxiing-- is beyond their capabilities.

I am a bit older and agree that most pilots die from doing the wrong thing. I disagree that most, or even many, are incompetent. Why are we so compliant? In my opinion most die from pulling back on the stick or yoke when they have no zoom reserve, no airspeed, to spend on altitude. A big part of that problem is that they are taught to do that. They are taught to pull back on the stick to maintain altitude when they bank. After really bad statistics, they were taught to limit bank. Still a problem. How about not pulling back on the stick or yoke when we bank? This would not eliminate all stalls in the pattern (fatalities,) but it would eliminate at least half. Dan Gryder's DMMS is a good start, but not pulling on the stick or yoke int the turn would be more effective. When too low to recover from any stall, maneuvering airspeed is more important than altitude. Pulling back on the stick becomes muscle memory which, outside IMC, is problematic. IMC pulling back is no more than a little airplane wing width and maneuvering airspeed is cross checked at the same time.

Stalling in the pattern, normally a fatality, occurs among very competent pilots otherwise. It occurs with experienced PPL, CPL, and ATP pilots more than with solo student pilots. The student is not the problem, the instructor is not the problem, the PPL or CPL or ATP pilot is not the problem. The school solution, the ACS, the slow moving bureaucracy is the problem. Make the FAA look good makes the FAA look good. It does not solve the problem.

I imagine that you meant: "that most pilots who die in crashes die from doing the wrong thing." I think statistics will show that the great majority of pilots are responsible, safe, and competent, and that most accidents occur when there are multiple problems to deal with and not enough attention is paid to one of them.

Fuel system problems have created emergencies that eventually killed no fewer than eleven pilots that I have personally at least met. That's over 50 years, but it's still an awful lot. IMHO not a single one of those accidents should have resulted in fatalities. In six cases Jet-A was substituted for Avgas, in three cases the pilot selected empty tanks for landing when he or she had ones with fuel in them and in two strikingly similar cases decades apart pilots failed to ensure on terra firma that they could actually draw fuel from a selected tank after the valve was reassembled incorrectly.

What actually killed all of these pilots were stalls. Either turning back, four, right after a takeoff where an engine quit, or trying to make the runway after turning back, two, trying to stretch a final to make a runway or a roadway, three, striking wires after choosing a "primo spot" on a roadway to land, once, and just plain loosing sight of the big picture while trying to restart the engine, once.

In three cases these aircraft were twins that still had an operating engine at the time of the stall. In the other eight the pilot could have glided and made controlled contact with the ground. I also know a pilot who lost both engines, in a twin with passengers on board, just seconds after retracting the gear, jet fuel again. He made a controlled decent into some mature trees, and everybody literally walked away.

Stalls at takeoff and approach altitude are nearly always fatal in my limited experience.

"In my opinion most die from pulling back on the stick or yoke when they have no zoom reserve, no airspeed, to spend on altitude."

That'll do it.

Almost fifty years ago dad took rubber cement and notebook paper and he covered the five instruments on his J-3's panel so I couldn't see them. I learned to fly feeling what the airplane did, how to glide, and how to augment my limited, 65, horsepower with altitude and stored kinetic energy. I was taught to aviate, not to read gauges.

Personally, I think new pilots spend waaaaay too much time on numbers. Sure, I learned to read numbers, analyse what they meant, and navigate later. Then to communicate much later, because no electrical system meant no radio back then. I taught dad's grand kids in a Chief, same-same except that 'Post-it Notes' had been invented.

Jackie

Yes, we were pre PTS later becoming ACS. We were pre V speeds. We were pre DPE and the GADO FAA guy conducted the test as he individually saw fit. I flew several airplanes that had no airspeed indicator installed at all. AG mechanics just cut the pitot on Pawnees and Callairs flush when they recovered over them. There were problems as FAA guys moved up without experience, but most had military experience in those days. The bean counters took charge, put together an effective scare campaign, and achieved a better safety record,,,except for fatalities. We had more incidents and accidents but no more fatalities. We had short runways, many city fields were grass, and pilots slowed accordingly on short final. Forced landing looked a lot like some of these runways anyway. We flew close enough to the earth to read road signs so climbing out too fast killed fewer of us. If you didn't have a radio at a tower field, a green light was fine. Airplanes had small engines and little tires. There was no insulation so you could hear relative wind.

You know you're winning when they use the words "debris field" in the description of the crash scene.

Contact, the issue with the PTS which was not made better by the ACS is that it was an attempt to use black and white words to describe understanding gained by feel and intuition.

Can you describe the nuances of riding a bicycle to someone? How about a 4 year old? And yet my kids mastered two wheel machines before they knew the alphabet.

Most birds are dumb as a bag of hammers and yet they can fly beautifully.

For decades we all got a good laugh out of the early passenger planes which left the pilot in an open cockpit so they could feel the air.

Maybe they weren't wrong, and students should learn to fly in something slow, high drag add low power and with no flight instruments.

aftCG wrote:... it was an attempt to use black and white words to describe...

Trying to describe an analog reality through the abstraction of a digital measurement system will never be fully successful. It's the 'Cliff's Notes' version.

Jackie

Static reaction to a dynamic world.

312hrs in nearly 3 decades of having his ticket?

Maybe a bunch of unlogged flight time? Or they couldn’t find his second logbook?

He didn’t take any non participating parties out, so I won’t judge a man who made a choice that only effected him, though I’m curious as to his training that led up to the ground loop and the later crash, lots of details missing.


Ether way RIP

NineThreeKilo wrote:312hrs in nearly 3 decades of having his ticket?

Maybe a bunch of unlogged flight time? Or they couldn’t find his second logbook?

The way I read it was he had one log book, and it was recovered. To my mind he was essentially a brand new pilot. Over 95% of his 312 hours were from 28 to 18 years before the crash...

NineThreeKilo wrote:He didn’t take any non participating parties out, so I won’t judge a man who made a choice that only effected him, though I’m curious as to his training that led up to the ground loop and the later crash, lots of details missing.

Maybe he got busy with other things, but he didn't keep current. He had zero logged time in the twelve years before he ground looped an airplane that he had just bought. Then he got a tail wheel endorsement, logging a tad under five hours in a different aircraft with an instructor. (Probably while his aircraft was being repaired.)

Then he killed himself just a minute after lifting off for the very first time in the airplane he had bought. Flying solo with zero time in type and zero solo time in a dozen years, and only eighteen hours in the past eighteen years.

NineThreeKilo wrote:Ether way RIP

Amen