L18C-95 wrote:While low experience was a factor the pilot does appear to have invested in getting appropriate training. I agree with SA Maule that the report might have spent more time on understanding other contributory factors.

The A/P disconnected at around 110 knots, possibly due to stick shaker activation. Vs clean is around 70 knots? Why did the stick shaker activate at this speed, if it was stick shaker activation that caused the A/P disconnect?

While speed and configuration are parameters, angle of attack/boundary layer separation via stall vane (s) or an AoA system may be the main parameter triggering the stick shaker/pusher? Also in clean configuration the un-accelerated Vs may be a bit higher, say 75 knots? It would have been interesting if there had been more comment on the design and activation parameters of the PC12 system? Activation at 109 Knots may suggest acceleration either due to gust/turbulence or the A/P or pilot had pulled some G – the pilot being possibly the more likely actor to pull G? Although being near convective activity turbulence would also be a candidate for triggering the stick shaker? Alternatively the stick shaker mode may have had quite conservative activation parameters if the aircraft is in clean configuration?

Very interesting accident scenario, however I think it somewhat jumped too quickly to the conclusion that it was pilot inexperience, which self evidently is a factor – a bit more engineering discussion on the automatic flight control aspects, the stick shaker/pusher system, and the interface with the A/P would have been useful.

SA Maule wrote:In answer to A1skinner: the specific incident referred to was the result of. The airlines refusal to pay the pilots pension fund and insurance because he didn't follow protocol. The airline then went after the AMO for not doing the work on the engine properly and they succeeded, the claim was settled between the opposing companies insurance brokers.

METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION

There was no record of a preflight weather briefing with Lockheed Martin Flight Services, or with DTC or CSC direct user access terminal (DUAT) vendor; however, the pilot did file the instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan with CSC DUATS.

Earlier that day after landing at FPR following a flight from the Bahamas, the pilot informed the fueler about the need for a quick turnaround. The pilot and fueler also discussed the local weather conditions.

The fixed base operator (FBO) where the pilot had been seen before departure contains a computer with access to weather information products; however, the software provider indicated there was no record of the pilot utilizing their system. No determination could be made whether the pilot obtained weather information from the computer at the FBO before the flight departed.

The southeast section of the surface analysis chart issued at 1100 EDT, or approximately 1 hour 5 minutes before the flight departed indicates a stationary front extended across northern Florida. The area forecast encompassing the area of southern and central portions of Florida issued on the day of the accident at 0445 EDT, and valid through 1700 EDT, indicated scattered clouds at 2,000 feet, broken clouds between 4,000 and 6,000 feet, with layered tops to 25,000 feet. Widely scattered light rain showers and isolated thunderstorms with light rain were forecast, with cumulonimbus cloud tops to 40,000 feet. Between 1100 and 1400 EDT, the forecast was for clouds scattered at 2,500 feet, broken at 5,000 feet, and broken at 12,000 feet, with widely scattered light rain showers and thunderstorms with tops to 42,000 feet. Convective Sigmet 35E existed over the planned route of flight, but it did not extend over the accident site area. Further, there was no organized area of turbulence or icing identified outside of the convective activity area.

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite No. 13 (GOES 13) infrared image at 1232, at 2X magnification indicates the accident site location was on the eastern side of an area of enhanced cloud cover associated with high cirrus clouds potentially from anvil from cumulonimbus clouds located to the west depicted by the enhanced areas in blue to yellow. Also depicted were multiple layers of clouds producing a broken to overcast layer of clouds over the accident site. No defined cumulonimbus clouds were observed within 20 miles of the accident site; however, cumulonimbus clouds were observed to the west through northwest between Plant City and Ocala, Florida.

The closest Weather Surveillance Radar (WSR-88D), was located about 48 miles east of the accident site. The 4.3 degree elevation scan, which encompassed altitudes between 21,080 and 25,920 feet, at 1233, depicted reflectivity of 0 to 15 dBZ, which equates to light intensity echoes. Additionally, the 4.3 degree elevation scan for 1233 with the flight path overlaid depicts clear areas east and southeast of the accident site area before the flight encountered the light intensity echo.

The current icing product (CIP) which provides a forecast of icing conditions indicates that for 25,000 feet at 1200 and 1300 EDT, the chance for light to moderate icing existed. The NTSB Weather Factual report is contained in the NTSB public docket.

The pilot of a Beechcraft Corporation 400A that was determined to be located about 13 nautical miles southeast of the accident airplane and at Flight Level (FL) 290 about the time the accident airplane began a right descending turn, reported his on-board weather radar was not depicting any returns. He also reported encountering light rime ice at the top of FL260 while in a cloud layer climbing to his assigned altitude; the airplane was clear of icing conditions within seconds. He further reported the temperature at FL 260 was ISA plus 10 to ISA plus 15.

A1Skinner wrote:It is the beautiful thing about it for sure. And I agree, you gotta keep flying the plane. Something that the pilot of this PC-12 did not do.

SA Maule wrote:
Most unfortunately we live in a very litigious environment, much more so in the USA than SA, at least here our courts allow common sense to prevail, if you put a hot cup of coffee between your legs, don't cry when you get burned

fredy wrote:

SA Maule wrote:

Could the pilot have prevented the crash? Yes, don't shut down good engine (I know that was hammered many times during my multi engine training). But what caused the crash? The fire due to negligence.

I guess one big difference is presumably the mechanics in the engine fire screwed up due to a mistake, not by design (like McD’s).
Again, don’t read this the wrong way, the modern litigious society drives me crazy, but like many have said in this thread and countless others on BCP, be careful about jumping to conclusions without all the facts.