Many Army innovations and solutions to problems start in the suggestion box. Often troops just develop a technique or solution as a workaround a problem. Brush rakes to bust through hedge rows in Normandy and lanyard slung mini-guns on Loaches are examples. Every Army school I attended in the 60s and 70s included "Lessons learned in Vietnam." Those were bottom up rather than top down information flow and systemic changes. As a teacher, I have always been open to suggestion. On the Navajo Reservation I assigned student squad leaders to help me teach large classes. I have taught safe maneuvering flight techniques from ever angle I could imagine and encourage you all to chime in with those and other techniques. Top down techniques from ACS and the Air Safety Institution have reduced incidents and accidents but not fatalities. AQP type recurrent training that Jaun and Dan have suggested is a good idea using accident analysis in place of expensive computerized flight simulators. We have airline pilots, crop dusters, low altitude airplane and helicopter operators, bush, and other professionals who also fly backcountry. They represent a lot of bottom up experience to draw from. I appreciate comments and criticism from all of you.
Between my Junior and Senior year at Southwest Missouri State, I was in the Army's test of using Tactical Officers rather than Drill Sergeants for Reserve Officers basic training. As an officer I appreciate what Drill Sergeants do for the Army. I have tremendous respect, however, for Major Voke who was my training company's Tactical Officer. The cadets from military families always answered his questions, "No excuse Sir." Major Voke would explain, "I didn't ask for a confession. I want to know why you chose to do what you did." We pilots, like Army officers, need to know why we chose to do what we do. We need to learn from poor training and poor performance as well as from good training and good performance. As PIC we have to analyse every technique and choose wisely. There may be valuable techniques involved in survival instinct as simple as down drainage egress. What we did in an incident or accident is valuable experience. Would a startle response survey find more survivors who pulled or who pushed on the yoke? Some of you, like me, did not climb, confess, and comply. And yet we survived. We need to know those lessons learned off the book as well.
What should Backcountrypilot's recurrent training look like? What techniques lead to survival, even amongst incident and accident? How could we improve the ACS based flight review? How can startle, ground rush, distraction, and poor energy management be mitigated? What are "stick and rudder skills?" "What I Learned about Flying from That" was good judgement training, but did we miss good survival technique gems? We all start with the school solution. But has doubling down on that in flight review mitigated fatalities? Can we break the cycle of good pilots losing their lives doing what they were school trained and flight review trained to do? Let's try.
