Capt. Chaos wrote:The ADS-B out signal also includes NIC/NAC numbers in its broadcast. These numbers are the GPS's position confidence, and the threshold for the signal to be displayed on a controllers screen can't be reliably maintained with a non TSO 145/146 WAAS receiver.
The TSO 129a equipment also has the confidence metrics included for an ADS-b out transmission. The difference is that the availability of the WAAS metrics is closer to 99% while TSO 129 metrics are only available about 89% of the time. I would assert that difference is almost inconsequential for most users.
The FAA has only mandated the use of WAAS since 2012 for ADS-b compliance. Prior to then, they embraced TSO129 for positional inputs. Here is one of many relevant circulars related to that from back when the FAA was still optimistic about the future of ADS-b:
https://www.aea.net/Training/courses/ADSBForum/pdf/AEA%20ADS-B%20Installation%20Guidance.pdfThe FAA has all but conceded that their analysis of system performance of ADS-b was pretty awful, and realized they could not get rid of any of the costly radar services that were major reasons to justify the costs of Nextgen. Then it was pointed out that even current traffic levels at several class bravo airspace cannot service all the aircraft with ADS-b services...there isn't enough bandwidth to support all the data. Then they degraded the weather component of the service and completely dropped the error correction elements of the ground to air and air to air to partly address the issue, yet they still require radar to fix the rest of the problem. Now a kid with a little google fu and some saved up lunch money can DDOS critical segments of the ADS-b services. The FAA responded by scrambling to filter out spoofed and spurious data from their ground based systems, but aircraft are still vulnerable with the air to air component. It will not surprise me one bit if the FAA nixes the air to air component entirely due to these critical vulnerabilities, or simply tells everyone that the collision avoidance component is useless unless the air to air component is somehow disabled. Collision avoidance would become useless at low level (like in the pattern) at many airports or in the mountains away from ground based systems. The ground based filters are still yielding failures as well.
In the end, ADS-b could have been wonderful. As it is, it has been a shaky, obsolete, and complex rollout that incurs unnecessary costs without discernible benefits to most GA users or even any users in general in my opinion. Apparently, the GAO has a similar opinion.
And apparently, if you use the FAA-provided and broadcasted weather data for navigational purposes and the reliance on that data results in an incident, you could be subject to an enforcement action.
To get back to whether a handheld unit provide sufficient accuracy to be used as a position source, I would disagree with the AOPA that they are adequate for integration into he ADS-b system. A TSO position source provides RAIM, FDE, and gives the ADS-b the aforementioned integrity metrics. I have never interfaced to a handheld unit that provided those metrics in the same way, although perhaps some exist that do. TSO-129 compliant sources are far less expensive right now than WAAS sources, and the existing GA fleet has almost 50% penetration for these sources. TSO145/6 penetration is hovering at 10%. The air carrier fleet has less than 10% equipped with ADS-b compliant systems according to the GAO and the FAA. If the airlines dont see a benefit, why will GA? But the allowance of TSO129 equipment would cut the cost of literally half of the ADSb installs in half, and cut the costs for the rest of the GA fleet by at least a quarter.