Never a good day when aircraft go down. Amazing the occupants of the Cirrus survive the midair.
Another plus for the chute system.
Sad day with the deaths of those in the Robinson.
http://washington.cbslocal.com/2014/10/ ... k-airport/
Fresno wrote:We lost two good men that could have been (in my opinion) saved by a ballistic parachute. I think I can spare the 40lbs of useful load to protect myself and my passenger.
Chutes were the norm on ultra lights a decade ago. As the UL became more reliable we saw a decline ballistic chutes. But, the chutes are lighter and more effective than ever.
My project to add the chute to my Carbon Cub begins tomorrow. Any technical advice is welcome.

Thirty years ago, when Alan was a young pilot, he was in a mid-air crash in the Midwest. He barely managed to bring his plane safely to the ground. He resolved that when he ran his own airplane-making company—he was such an entrepreneur that he thought of it as when, not if—he would protect pilots against this danger by equipping entire airplanes (not just passengers) with parachutes. That is what Cirrus did, with its SR-20 and SR-22 aircraft. The Cirrus pilot's split-second decision to deploy the parachute appears to have saved that plane's occupants, while tragically the helicopter was destroyed on impact after falling 1000 feet to the ground.

contactflying wrote:In the last fifty years, I have watched the top of the panel in small airplanes grow higher to accommodate the higher stacks of radios and electronic stuff. The Army has been sensitive about that sort of thinking, preferring not to give up visual situational awareness for electronic.

contactflying wrote:Pierre,
I think training in forced landings down to 200,' spot landing training, and look out the window situational awareness training would do a lot more to mitigate fatalities in general aviation than would parachutes.


140flyer wrote:Regarding
"If your parachute data is correct, it would work as well for high wing."
Absolutely no argument there. There is a certified BRS STC for the Cessna 182 and likely others as well. Of course in the experimental world, there are even more options. One of our local good friends and Tahoe area seaplane pilot is putting one on his SeaRey.
Regarding
"Low wing airplanes crash better than high wing."
I never thought of that. Although I'm fairly new to this forum, in that short time, I have come to recognize your very long and broad experience and have learned from you. My thoughts are based on the stories of many low wing GA airplanes where the pilot did an admirable job of a forced deadstick, off-airport landing, only to have that low wing full of 100LL breached by a rock or sign post or whatever, and everyone perishes in the fireball.
I attended the HSF at 3SGS last year, and besides the infamous red Mooney, 99% of the airplanes are high wing and most with some sort of burly landing gear. I'm in the process of the first seasonal conversion of my 182 amphib to wheel gear and I'm installing the Landis fork with a Goodyear 8.50 on the nose and mains for now, with 29" ABW's on order. All this based largely on advice from this forum and local BCPers.
It seems readily apparent that high wings provide improved clearance over ground obstacles like rocks, posts, etc. and are less likely to receive damage to the wings and ailerons from debris kicked up and less likely to breach a fuel tank. So, I guess my thinking was that given the choice of which plane they'd rather make a forced landing into rough terrain with (assuming no BRS chute on board), that the majority on this knowledgeable forum would choose a high wing (Cub, Maule, Cessna, etc.) over a Cirrus, Bonanza, Mooney, etc.
Regarding
"The main design objective in modern spray planes is crash survivability. They are all low wing. The wing absorbs the energy of a crash much better than gear and fuselage."
Again, your experience in dusting is great and makes for informative and very entertaining reading. I've loved it! While I know almost nothing about crop dusting, I'll put my businessman cap on to suggest a harsh alternative. Namely that "crash survivability" is NOT the "main" design objective, but rather a strong secondary design objective. The main design objective of a working-for-profit aircraft is efficacy and cost to complete the missions. Otherwise, you'd have, for instance, all sorts of steel reinforcement, and a much smaller useful load to haul the pesticides you're getting paid to apply.
The low wing design of Thrushes, Pawnees, etc. are obviously the most efficient and effective for the installation of the spray bars and related gear. I'm not saying the businessmen who make the financial and design decisions don't love you pilots, just that they're looking at the job to get done first.
Back to the bigger topic of what lessons or ideas can we draw from this accident. For me, one is further proof that the chute works to save lives. Another is reinforcement of the obvious of keeping our heads up and eyes open, especially in the airport environment and especially with helicopters around. Lastly, regarding this immediate discussion, for me, if the piston single I'm flying isn't well-suited for off airport ops, then I want a chute on board!
Pierre
PS I just saw the exchange with Zzz. Yep, same old "arguments" that really aren't an argument. Yes, we should all keep our heads up and we should all FTFP. With a chute, the main difference is when someone doesn't (either you or the other guy), the penalty doesn't have to be death.
GumpAir wrote:In the GA world, how many control surface failures occur each year, other than those where a linkage/cable are accidentally reversed by a mechanic and evident a few seconds into take-off roll?
Compare that to the number of accidents caused by head up ass pilots looking at electronics inside the cockpit, instead of looking outside for other aircraft. Bet those numbers aren't even close.


Statistics on 105 in-flight collisions that occurred from 1964 to 1968 show that 82 percent had convergence angles associated with one aircraft overtaking another. Specifically, 35 percent were from 0 to 10 degrees - straight from behind. Only 5 percent were from a head-on angle. These numbers, plus the fact that 77 percent occurred at or below 3,000 feet (with 49 percent at or below 500 feet) imply accurately that in-flight collisions generally occur in the traffic pattern and primarily on final approach. Collisions occurring enroute generally are at or below 8,000 feet and within 25 miles of an airport.
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