Not the FAA, but at least a government agency is seriously looking at training deficiencies rather than noncompliance in an attempt to reduce loss of control fatalities. My pointing this deficiency out for years has not made me popular. While not on the federal payroll, instructors were expected to make the FAA look good.

Do "stick and rudder" skills mean to just keep practicing the maneuvers in the old PTS, now called something else but essentially the same? Why don't younger than 50 pilots know what contact flying means?

Wagstaff is correct that acrobatic training will help reduce loss of control fatalities. We crop dusters know, however, that stall recovery techniques don't help at low altitude like takeoff, landing, ferry to field, field high (200') recon, field low recon, and ferry back to the airport.

To be fully trained against a loss of control fatality, we need all the maneuvering flight techniques as well as acrobatic training.

Wagstaff mentions the startle factor in loss of control fatalities. Stall and spin training, already in the initial training and concurrent (flight review) program, help. Acrobatic training gives greater confidence, I think. Confidence is a big antistartle factor. What about takeoff and landing?

Iterations: how many times each year do we:
Takeoff high or heavy or in the heat of day or all three knowing that ground effect is critical, wind management is critical, down drainage is critical, topographical route to destination is critical, zoom reserve in airspeed may be all the altitude we can gain, thermals matter, ridge lift matters, using vertical space available matters, not pulling back on the stick in the turns matters, and landing on the beginning of the landing zone matters?

If we are not jealously storing all energy available in airspeed or altitude as appropriate, we may be startle prone. If we have not accepted that the engine will quit just after liftoff, we may be startle prone. If we need a steep turn to miss something and are not comfortable letting the nose go down as designed, we may be startle prone. If we insist on holding altitude in downdrafts, we may be startle prone. If we prefer aileron over rudder for upset recovery, the aileron may not "go out" but the wing will not come up smartly ie startle.

Contact flying was considered more important than instrument and then schools started integrating instrument with contact. Eventually instrument became more important than contact, even for non-rated pilots. Finally, loss of control became the number one killer.

Instrument training is good training and IFR is the safest way to fly. The reason that maneuvering is highly limited in both pitch and bank in IMC is that interpreting instrument indications is slower and less complete situational awareness than contact. Twelve of my thirteen forced landings were six second deals. Instrument interpretation takes too long. Startle recovery takes too long.

contactflying wrote:Why don't younger than 50 pilots know what contact flying means?

Because our generation of pilots calls it "pilotage".

Its gonna be fun to fly with you Jim.

Yes, integration started with integration of pilotage, navigation by reference to terrain and man made structures, with ADF and VOR instrument navigation. It evolved into control of the aircraft by contact, control of the aircraft by reference to terrain and man made structures along with relative wind noise, engine noise, buoyancy, speed of nose movement, apparent rate of closure, etc, integration with flight control instrument indications. Eventually, flight control instrument indications became the dominate control technique and contact flying fell by the wayside.

Enter increase in loss of control fatalities.

Navigation by pilotage or instrument indications is not the factor causing loss of control. Flight control instrument indications becoming dominate with near complete exclusion of flight control of the aircraft by reference to terrain and man made structures along with relative wind noise, engine noise, buoyancy, speed of nose movement, and apparent rate of closure is the problem.

As old instructors, we err in blaming the student, commercial, airline, and any other pilot trained in the one size fits all program which is heavily weighted toward airline needs. The system has failed those who lose control. They were not taught to control the aircraft in fluid situations.

Contact:

Nice summary.

FWIW my wife gets a subscription to AOPA's Flight Training Magazine. I picked it up this am and thumbed through it a few minutes ago, before reading your post. I found a short 3/4 page article about a ferry flight in a "well maintained" AirCoupe that "hadn't flown for a few years". All was well for 15.3 hours over the broad plains of Texas and some night flying over New Mexico & Arizona. Then "the engine quit" about 20' above the runway on an intersection takeoff (we won't discuss intersection takeoffs here... ). He (the pilot) landed straight ahead on the remaining runway. The engine spontaneously re-ignited when all three wheels touched asphalt. Sensible guy, he taxied to the ramp and investigated. No issues surfaced. Engine op was 'normal'. Maybe a "little water in the fuel”? Sumped... no H2O found. This time the pilot requested the entire 8,700' runway. This time he made it a little higher... engine quit! He landed, taxied back, and eventually (after neither he or an A&P found any anamolies) pulled the carbeurator and sent it out for rebuild. It was junk.

The pilot was both lucky and proficient. He also had some good system knowledge. I think we need all three. The more proficient we are and the more system knowledge we have the better we are at speedily transiting through the 'startle effect' and dealing with a problem... AND the less we depend on 'luck' to have a good outcome.

I had a student lose an engine in my Ercoupe near Zuni, New Mexico. He landed on the road without injury or damage. Not as big a deal there. I saw the Ercoupe you mentioned on the news.

Pattie Wagstaff, talking about startle, got me to thinking about the downdraft into the surface that I have argued against. I have always pitched down in downdrafts and built zoom reserve in the form of airspeed. What if a pilot tried to maintain altitude by pitching up to Vy pitch attitude? I have always believed that while wrong control input, that he would still survive because the downdraft would not go to the ground. The compression at the bottom causes a significant bump or upset. I have always been going fast if not maneuvering speed here. What if I were slow and almost at the critical angle of attack when I hit the compressed and somewhat agitated air? Could this cause startle and result in me stalling the airplane and impacting the ground some 200 feet or so on down?

I almost said, "the airplane stalling," but that can't happen. Only the pilot can stall the airplane by pulling back on the stick.

Poor training meaning the instructor did a poor job training the student or the check ride standards are poor?
My opinion is the latter and instructors have a hard time getting students to pay for lessons that 'arent part of the exam'.

In my experience, instructors are incentivized to get you able to pass the check ride in the least amount of hours (cost) as possible.
That equates to memorizing airspeed numbers and throttle settings for a given image on the attitude indicator to make sure the altimeter stays within a given range...and not much to do with flying the airplane.

That may be all fine if you're pushing on to be a commercial pilot and never plan to fly a 172 after you get your multi engine rating.....

Perhaps (Call me crazy) having the Private Pilot certificate as a stepping stone to commercial jet operator is where it's broken.
Perhaps the training course for us little guys flying little airplanes should be completely separate from the budding airline pilot.

After getting my license in a 172, I learned more in an hour flying a 140 with my tailwheel instructor. (Oh, THATS what adverse yaw is).

I think little airplane piloting should be taught in 65hp Aerona Champs with minimal instruments so students get real feedback from the airplane and have to learn to fly the wing - vs a 172 where you can nearly pass your check ride with your feet on the floor while never looking outside the window.

</$0.02>

Well said, Bagaire.

Back to Pattie Wagstaf and the value of aerobatic training. It is good training but comes from high altitude orientation. The recent Citabria fatality in Wyoming illustrates this. The pilot turned crosswind steeply and level after gaining about 400' in a Vy pitch attitude takeoff. He stalled and rotation started. Startle did not get him. In the first ninety degrees of spin, he stopped the rotation with rudder and recovered from the stall by releasing the back pressure on the elevator. He did not have enough vertical space available for this inadvertent aerobatic maneuver. Safe maneuvering flight techniques would have helped because airspeed over altitude would have prevented stall. Very good aerobatic training did not help. It did show that he was a very proficient pilot with high altitude orientation. Had the stall, from too slow airspeed, happened at appropriate high altitude orientation altitude, no accident would have resulted from the inadvertent stall/spin.

I had the very same thing happen in a C-150 at Montrose Colorado practicing chandells when I was too young to understand that they certainly didn't necessarily cause climb in rough air in the mountains. I experienced an inadvertent stall/spin. High altitude saved me. When I started Ag training later, I realized high altitude orientation would not cut it.

It is not that the high altitude biased training is not fine for high altitude flying, it is just incomplete training. By teaching high altitude orientation exclusive of low altitude orientation and intimidating pilots into believing that maneuvering flight (as in low altitude) is somehow illegal, the system has programmed itself for fewer incidents and accidents and just as many fatalities. If the U.S. Air Force orientation that only things that are written down somewhere are proper techniques was fully incorporated into Army Aviation after the separation, there would have been no helicopters in Vietnam.

So what the schools are teaching is proper high altitude orientation. That works for the airlines because the equipment will get those pilots up to high altitude quickly and safely and the only low altitude work, takeoff and landing, is canned and computerized. The trick is to not lose so many future airline pilots and young instructors in the Cessna 172, a very safe airplane in maneuvering flight with low altitude orientation. And then there are all those Ag, patrol, glider tow, banner tow, bush, and back country pilots.

Ahh, the ghost of Patty Wagstaff, isn't she our age, in her 70's? Jealous she got to fly the OV-10, my bucket list airplane. I imagine her (or me) taking it down some bird-dog canyon run, in turbulence and 1/2 viz in smoke...
Working with students in and out of the school system I agree that the big part of non-airline oriented flying (the low altitude stuff) isn't there. No instructors to teach it, school safety-management SOP's preclude it, their time and focus is on making airline pilots that avoid compromising situations instead of learning how to deal with them.
I was bringing a SuperPuma back through the mountains in weather a few weeks ago and had a barrage of weather/decision questions from the other pilot, that had solid helicopter mountain experience, but was curious how a small VFR airplane pilots could safely deal with the same situation.
You have to know where the edge is, nibble at it, something Patty's aerobatic training can help you with.
Heard she put a Gamebird down into a field in Florida a few weeks ago and walked away. You never know when fate will demand an exercise of all those skills.

Okay, I’ll just say this: Many flight schools aren’t “airline oriented”, whatever that means. That term is pejorative in the extreme in my opinion. Some of the best stick and rudder pilots I’ve ever flown with were airline pilots. They knew what the rudders were for, and heir skills were impeccable.

But, back to schools: In their defense, flight schools are mostly one lawsuit away from oblivion. So, like most of us, they manage risk. Sometimes, that gets taken to extremes, and that’s not healthy, nor productive.

But, in general, it’s NOT because they’re “trying airline pilots”. It’s that their instructor cadre is nearly uniformly the lowest flight time, minimally experienced segment of aviators on the planet.

Now, wouldn’t it be great if every flight instructor came to the job with a large bucket of “real world” experience (whatever THAT is)? But, that’s never gonna happen.

Now, add to that the fact that most CFIs are also young, and shall we say, a bit “adventurous”. I can recall a young hot running CFI who took one of his students down low in a river drainage……shits and giggles, right till they hit the wire.

Liability is what actually restricts flight instruction, folks, NOT “airline mills”.

When I ran the program at the college, I tried to get out with every student in weather conditions that required a SVFR clearance. NOT to teach them they should be flying in that kind of weather, but rather, this is what you may have to do when you’ve screwed up. That was the lesson: take them out locally, low, get them totally lost. Then start asking questions: Where do you suppose that creek/highway/etc over there goes? Any towers out here? Etc.

Every student I did that exercise with was spooked by it, but admitted that it was a good exercise, not because it taught them what it really looks like down there in the crud.

Unfortunately, we never had an instructor stick around long enough that I’d trust him or her to play that game with a student……liability.

Now, get back to beating up “airline pilots”.

MTV

I agree MTV, it's more liability. I know it's not doing any good. We had an instructor volunteer for an Angel Flight a few months ago. She then called back and asked if she could take a commercial student along. Great learning experience that we had no problem with. A couple hrs later Sue called and cancelled because she was worried that it would get dark before they got back. An instructor and commercial student were to nervous to fly in the dark away from the big city...

What's the difference between poor training and lack of training? I don't think my primary training was poor. It provided a foundation to use an aircraft within prescribed limits (bank angles, airspeeds, etc), knowledge of ATC interactions, weather, and all of the other regulatory stuff. I didn't feel unsafe operating in decent weather flying within those limits. A school's job is to teach to the government syllabus, and the syllabus prescribes the minimum acceptable standards adequate to be a functional pilot. Perhaps the introduction of an advanced private pilot rating could serve the purpose of exploring slow flight, spins, precision flying, high bank angles, etc. An airmanship rating that requires enough total time (150 hours?) to be able to move beyond the basic info (aircraft systems, regulations, talking to ATC, etc) and into exploring some of advanced concepts of aircraft control might better serve the accident statistics, and serve as the gateway to an insurance premium reduction. In summary, blaming it on 'poor' training feels like a cop out.

It is not that the training is poor, just that it doesn't cover the most dangerous areas of flight as well as the higher and safer areas. The industry needs to look at what is causing fatalities and be open to new ideas. Vy is taught because it will math out in calm air to the fastest way to get up. Do we have to get up fast in a 172? Is that a safe orientation to start students and young instructors with? Sure practice stalls and teach students the razors edge...up high, not on takeoff. If we simply taught students to accelerate as far as possible in low ground effect, top obstructions only just high enough to be comfortable, and climb fast enough to see well over the high and in your face panel, many lives would be saved.

On the landing end, the idea that extra airspeed is safer is crazy. We don't see that on the interstate highway. While 1.3 Vso is the best long final approach speed to get up close to the runway where we can actually see what is down there, rounding out at that airspeed gives the student the absolute hardest landing situation possible: a long hold off where he is basically a passenger until the airplane eventually slows enough to descend the final few feet to land. He is presented with elevator only as both an airspeed control and a maintain altitude control. Rate of descent control? There is no rate of descent control until the airplane slows enough to descend the final few feet to land. Throttle was designed movable for a reason. It sure helps with glide angle and rate of descent when we are slow enough to allow power/pitch to decelerate and descend all the way to a slow and soft touchdown on the numbers. Not only is this safer, it is much easier to learn.

Because the Private Pilot Written Test questions as if students had been flying in the airlines for years and because many flying techniques taught are the most difficult and least safe, we have some problems resulting in takeoff and landing fatalities. This emphasizes book knowledge and some memorization rather than simply teaching flying in a way that any young person could learn, given the money, flying as easily as driving or operating any machine.

MTV neither me nor my instructors ever considered liability in my instruction. My local FBO at little Aurora, Missouri has seven planes now, has had airplanes crash with fatalities, had a crazy mechanic who was seeding oil filters with metal once, and is still there some forty years now. Yes unusual, but there are still parts of the country where sue them is not the first thought. Government can work when those with titles are more interested in doing than in being.

mtv wrote:In their defense, flight schools are mostly one lawsuit away from oblivion. So, like most of us, they manage risk. Sometimes, that gets taken to extremes, and that’s not healthy, nor productive.

But, in general, it’s NOT because they’re “trying airline pilots”. It’s that their instructor cadre is nearly uniformly the lowest flight time, minimally experienced segment of aviators on the planet.

Liability is what actually restricts flight instruction, folks, NOT “airline mills”.

I have seriously considered instructing. I could probably teach some folks a thing or two, plus learn a bit myself and have fun doing it. But liability is one thing that keeps me away from it. I have a family to think about. Juice ain't worth the squeeze.

The aviation community solved the liability of manufacturing with the General Aviation Revitalization Act in 1994. It would be nice if we could do something similar for CFI liability. Such a change might have all sorts of positive benefits.

Having neither medical nor certificate is better than an expensive lawyer. They never go after the passenger.

Someone with bandwidth and energy should start an old instructors Forum. We are too old, poor, and senile to have money, medicals and certificates, thus somewhat immune to liability. Ride with local instructors occasionally on your dime. What are you going to spend social security on anyway. The FBO will appreciate your input, even when it just makes the young instructor safer. They, as well as the fresh PPL, should have the opportunity of license to learn.

"Do you want to do or be?" John Boyd